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RECENT CASE NOTES
in the same way it might itself enter originally into a similar contract. 1 6
This statement, which presupposes an implied "ratification" in certain cases,
e. g. where, as here, the promoters enter into a contract for the benefit of the
corporation with the understanding (which may be implied) that the contract
will be performed by the corporation, and the latter with knowledge, accepts
the benefits thereof, follows necessarily from the decisions in three recent
Indiana cases relied on by the court.17
The significance of the case is in its qualification of the rule laid down in
the earlier Indiana case of Cushion Heel Shoe Co. qr. Hartt18, viz., that a
corporation will be held liable for services rendered by its promoters before
incorporation only when, by express action taken after it becomes a legal
entity, it recognizes or affirms such claim. The court in that case took the
hasty position that there was no median between the extremes of express
action and mere acceptance of benefits which the corporation could not reject
without ceasing existence. The instant case expressly disapproves the Cushion
Heel case to the extent it is in conflict, and makes a well reasoned statement
of the rule. W. A. V.
TAXATION-INTEROVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-TAATION OF THE INCOME OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES BY A STATE.-Respondent, an attorney for the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, sought a refund of income tax paid to the State
of New York on his salary for the year 1934. The New York Court of
Appeals held such income immune on the authority of New York ex rel. Rogers
v. Graves.1 Held, such a tax is not a burden on national government as to
be within an implied restriction upon the taxing power of the national and
16 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 209.
17 Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts (1926), 91 Ind. App. 501, 151 N. E. 7,
allowed recovery etc. for an assignment of a lease, the court held ihat the
corporation by accepting the lease and constructing a mine on the property had
knowingly received the benefits of the contract. Seymour Improvement Co.
v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1928), 87 Ind. App. 179, 161 N. E. 389, holding
corporation's silence when it received bills and learned plaintiff was looking to
it for payment after allowing plaintiff to install sprinkler system was sufficient
ratification of act of its president in entering into unauthorized contract. Hoosier
Lumber Co. v. Spear (1935), 99 Ind. App. 532, 189 N. E. 633, holding corpora-
tion liable on contract of promoter beneficial to corporation and acquiesced in
by three officers with knowledge.
18 Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt (1913), 181 Ind. 167, 103 N. E. 1063,
holding evidence of silence when claim presented to directors not such affirmance
as to constitute ratification.
1 The New York Tax Law (c. 59, McKinney's Consolidated Laws), Sec.
359-2-f, provided expressly for exemption of salaries, wages and other compen-
sation received from the United States of official or employees thereof, in-
cluding persons in the military or naval forces of the United States. In the
Rogers case, the Appellate Court of New York stated that the relator had
not invoked Sec. 359-2-f, and decided the case only on the constitutional ques-
tion. There does not appear in the decision in the instant case any attempt
of the taxpayer to rely on the exemption statute. Subdivision f has been
repealed by an act of May 28, 1937, L. 1937, c. 719, but the repeal was
effective only as of that date. Compare State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Van Cott
(1939), 59 S. Ct. 605.
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state governments. Collector v. Day2 and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves3
overruled so far as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from
income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a
state government or their instrumentalities. Graves V. People of State of
New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939), 59 S. Ct. 595.
In the past decade the problem of inter-governmental immunity from
taxation has been the subject of much litigation and of many discourses
by legal writers. With the advantage of hindsight, it is interesting to follow the
insertion of the doctrine of inter-governmental reciprocal immunity into our
constitution and then watch it being slowly erased. The difficulty lies in the
fact that so far the eraser has failed completely to expunge the insertion,
leaving an illegible mark.
From the pen of Chief Justice Marshall came the phrase that "The power
to tax involves the power to destroy," 4 which caused later Justices fearing
the abuse of this great power to create the implied constitutional intergovern-
mental immunity. The force of the decision of Collector v. Day5 started the
swinging of the pendulum in favor of immunity until the pendulum reached
its peak in Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,6 in which the Court
recognized the immunity to be absolute without consideration of how great
or small the burden might be upon either government. In recent years the
pendulum has gone in the opposite direction with the court making distinctions
between governmental and proprietary functions,7 essentipl and non-essential
activities, 8 and direct and indirect burdens.0  Following this trend more
classifications were made by striking out the independent government con-
tractor1 0 and then the government lessee"l from the sanctified class of the
immune. In the more recent case of Helvering v. Gerhardt12 the Court
abolished the theory that the immunity was absolute and required a direct
and substantial burden upon the government in order to bring the taxpayer
within the implied immunity. In the instant case the pendulum has apparently
increased speed in its swing back by the Court's abolition of the implied
constitutional immunity.
The Court definitely approves the theory that a non-discriminatory income
tax on the salary of an employee of the government or its instrumentality
is so indirect or incidental as not to constitute a burden upon either govern-
ment, and therefore no grounds for an implied constitutional immunity.
Beyond this point the Court gives grounds for many possible implications
but few statements upon which to base an accurate prediction of the future
movements of the pendulum.
2 (1870), 11 Wall 113.
a (1936), 299 U. S. 401, 57 S. Ct. 689.
4 McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. 316.
5 (1870), 11 Wall 113.
6 (1931), 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601.
7 South Carolina v. United States (1905), 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110.
8 Helvering v. Therrell (1938), 303 U. S. 218, 58 S. Ct. 539.
9 Education Films Corp. v. Ward (1931), 282 U. S. 379, 51 S. Ct. 170.
10 James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1937), 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208.
i1 Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp. (1938), 303 U. S. 37, 58 S. Ct. 623.
12 Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938), 304 U. S. 405, 52 S. Ct. 969.
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Relying on Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's theory that the state and federal
powers of taxation do not stand on a parity which is based on the doctrine
of federal supremacy,13 the court inferred that it did not completely abolish
the possible immunity of federal employees from state taxes although such
taxes are non-discriminatory. Another reason stated for the possible im-
munity of federal employees is that the federal government is one of dele-
gated-powers, and has been given the implied power to do whatever is
needful or appropriate, if not expressly prohibited, to protect its agencies.14
Here, the Court stopped, however, expressly leaving open the question of how
far Congress may go in protebting these instrumentalities from state taxation.1 5
The second inference comes from the statement that such a tax is laid
upon income which becomes the property of the taxpayer when received as
compensation for his services, and the tax laid upon the privilege of receiving
it is paid from his private funds and not from the funds of the government,
either directly or indirectly.16 This seems to be a definite change from the old
economic theory of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in the Pollock case that a tax on
the income of employees from the government, or receipts from governmental
bonds is a tax on the governmental powers,17 and a move toward the view
that the income, be it salary or other compensation, when received has become
merely money in the recipient's pocket and taxable as such without reference
to the source from which it came. If this is true under what power can
Congress make wages or interest received from the national government
immune from state taxation? Should the Court follow such theory of income
to a logical conclusion it would be inconsistent to allow even Congress to
declare such earnings to be immune.1 8
The third possibility for an assumption arises in the Court's strong reliance
13 In answering the argument that the taxing powers of the state and federal
government are concurrent, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said, "The people of all
the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by their
representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions
of the States, they tax their constituents and these taxes must be uniform.
But, when a State taxes the operations of the government of the United States,
it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people
over whom they claim no control." McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat
316, 435. Also see Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 236.
14 Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938), 304 U. S. 405, 411, 58 S. Ct. 969, 971;
Bank of New York v. Supervisors of New York County (1868), 7 Wall. 26,
30. Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 211.
15 Why should the national government be able to exempt its employees
from state taxation by legislative action, which would be allowing Congress
to write an immunity which the court refuses to imply in the constitution, but
not allow the states to protect their employees from taxation which is far more
onerous?
16 59 S. Ct. 595, 598.
17 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1894), 158 U. S. 601, 630, 15
S. Ct. 673.
18 Note, however, that the Court assumes the express congressional grant
of immunity to the principal and interest of HOLC bonds from state taxation
to be valid. The Court also states that there is a basis for implying an
immunity from state income taxation upon the salary of an employee of the
national government if there is such an economic burden by the tax as to
amount to an interference by one government with another. Query, is this
limited to discriminatory taxes?
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upon Hel'vering mi Gerhardfl9 and its reiteration of the statement that a non-
discriminatory tax on an employee of the national or state government is but
the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
governments, each possessing the taxing power; but then it goes beyond the
Gerhardt decision by stating there is no implied restriction in the constitution
prohibiting such taxation. This would seem to give a strong basis for pre-
diction that the court may not concede to Congress the power to declare
the employees or officers of the federal government or its instrumentalities
immune from non-discriminatory taxation.
The Court has not taken a direct stand on the immunity of income from
government bonds.20 This leaves the question of whether or not the Court
will make a distinction between the borrowing power and the employing
power so as also to remove the implied immunity from interest on govern-
mental bonds and obligations, state or federal. The same result should follow
in either case if the court is to be consistent, but what the Court will actually
decide is a matter for conjecure.
However, since the Supreme Court has failed to exercise a complete use
of its eraser, it will be interesting to watch whether the next step will be
another use of the eraser or the use of the pen. I. K.
TAXATION-MULTIPLE DoMICIL.-Edward Green was born in England in
1868, was educated in Vermont and New York, voted and carried on business
in Texas from 1892 to 1911, was later engaged in business in New York, and
after 1927 spent most of his time in Massachusetts and Florida alternating
from one state to another thereby successfully evading taxes. Until his death,
in 1936, he maintained that his domicil was in Texas. Texas, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, and New York tax officials threatened to treat him as if he were
domiciled in their respective jurisdictions at the time of his death and thus
subject to their inheritance taxes on his intangible property wherever located.
Since the aggregate of these taxes and the Federal Estate Tax would exceed
the net value of the estate by over a million and a half dollars, and as Texas
had little of the estate in its jurisdiction to levy on, there was danger of
inability to enforce its tax. Therefore, Texas brought this original action
against the other states in the United States Supreme Court in the nature of a
bill of interpleader to get a determination of the domicil of decedent. Taking
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found the decedent's domicil was in Massa-
chusetts at the time of death. Texas v. Florida (1939), 59 S. Ct. 563.
The jurisdiction to impose inheritance taxes on intangibles follows the
domicil of the decedent; thus the determination of domicil is a jurisdictional
issue.1 Although it is a well accepted common law rule that a person can
have but one domicil, nevertheless, on occasion two states have found the
same person to be domiciled for tax purposes within their respective borders
at the same time. The United States Supreme Court has refused to take
19 (1938), 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969.
20 It is admitted that this problem was not in issue in the instant case.
I Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn. (1930), 208 U. S. 204, 74 L. ed. 371,
50 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 A. L. R. 1000; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932),
284 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 313, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 77 A L. R. 1401.
